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7/7: An academic and reflexive re-evaluation of journalistic practice. 
Dr Paul Lashmar. Journalism, University of Sussex. 
 
Abstract 
 
The July 2005 London Bombings are the most serious terror attacks in the 
United Kingdom to date in the so-called ‘war on terror’. Many books, papers 
and chapters have been published on the war on terror but few journalists have 
reflected on the domestic coverage of the 7/7 attacks. This paper is written by a 
journalist who covered both the suicide attacks of 7th July (7/7) and 21st July 
(21/7) for a national newspaper and more recently is a practitioner-academic. 
Using academic texts focussing on the reporting of the ‘war on terror’ as stimuli 
for scholarly reflection, this paper reviews the author’s own coverage using 
reflexive practice and content analysis. Some 63 authored articles were 
considered from the period. The paper places 7/7 in the continuum of reporting 
subsequent to 11th September 2001 (9/11) and issues discussed include news 
values, patriotic reporting, elite sources, interacting with the security forces, 
agency and editorial stances. The paper argues that while many academic texts 
see journalism as hegemonic and monolithic, responding to events in a 
homogenous reactivity, that in practice news organisations can have graded 
responses and journalists agency. 
Keywords: terrorism: 7/7, 21/7, 9/11; London bombings; national security 
reporting 
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7/7: An academic and reflexive re-evaluation of journalistic practice. 
Introduction 
There are numerous books, chapters and articles on the reporting of the so-
called ‘war on terror’. Fewer though, specifically deal with the terror attacks in 
London in July 2005 and ever fewer are from journalists reflecting on their 
reporting of the successful 7/7 and the failed 21/7 attacks and very few, if any,  
have done so in an academic context. The author attempts to remedy this 
omission. The aim of this paper is to consider the reporting of 7/7 and the 
aftermath from the perspective of an academic-practitioner who covered the 
event for a UK national newspaper. This is undertaken using reflexive practice 
of the author’s own 7/7 journalism and then reflecting on that corpus in the light 
of the subsequent academic discourse on the reporting of the London attacks. 
Academics have used a range of concepts including political ritual, hegemony 
and elite discourse to consider coverage of 7/7. The author seeks to benefit from 
this discourse. After all, if published academic research and texts have no 
impact on or do not encourage reflection in the practitioner its value is much 
reduced. The interaction between journalists and academics over practice is not 
always an easy one. Morrison and Tumber, when conducting their ethnographic 
study of the British reporters who from the Falklands conflict observed that:  
It is strange to find journalists, whose business is to enquire into the 
occupations and lives of others, so frequently making the comment that it 
is impossible to understand their occupation unless one has oneself been a 
journalist.  
They continued: 
Reading the academic literature one cannot help feel sympathy with the 
journalists’ claim that the ‘outside’ has failed to get inside the trade: it is 
all too formalistic, too sterile, too serious; and it is not surprising that 
working journalists fail to recognise the world they are supposed to 
inhabit (1988 viii).  
Now that practice research is more common and granular and the number of 
reflexive practitioners lecturing in universities has increased, there is greater 
understanding of working practices. There has also been greater interest in 
developing theories of practice and how they relate to power. As Ryfe notes this 
has developed a philosophical dimension: ‘Among news production scholars, 
interest in the theory of Bourdieu, Giddens, Latour and related authors has 
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grown in the last 20 years’ (2017). Bourdieu identifies and names the way the 
journalist connect in the ‘field of journalism’, how it interacts with the political 
and economic field. He identifies a ‘habitus’ – a structure that organises practice 
and the perception of practices or as some have simplified as a ‘a feel for the 
game’ that can change over time and is neither a result of free will, nor 
determined by structures, but created by a kind of interplay between the two 
over time. Bourdieu’s ideas around practice are helpful in reflecting how 
newsdesks function. Schultz picks up on Bourdieu’s concept of doxa and 
defines it as the journalistic ‘gut feeling’ as the ‘seemingly self-evident and self-
explaining sense of newsworthiness’ that all journalists share (2007 190, 191). 
This I recognise and like all silent assumptions embedded in practice it needs to 
be critically examined. 
Context 
Coverage of the July 2005 attacks place the attacks in the context of the ‘war on 
terror’ rather than a sui generis event - as significant as the attacks may have 
been with some 52 deaths. These acts of terror are in a continuum - the latest in 
a horrendous manifestation - of what has been a running story since 9/11.   
The Author  
In July 2005 I was a regular contributor to the Independent on Sunday (IoS) 
covering the ‘war on terror’. As an investigative journalist with national security 
reporting experience my role was to give depth to the paper’s reporting, 
primarily on the UK domestic front.  I was well versed in the emergence of the 
new manifestations of terrorism that had developed from the 1970s, most 
spectacularly to highlight the Palestinian and Irish Republican causes.  From 
1998 to May 2001 I had been the Independent’s accredited reporter with a 
formal links on behalf of the paper with the security services. Then I was 
recruited to the IoS four days after 9/11 to contribute to a rolling news agenda 
of related stories: the aftermath of 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan, the US 
anthrax campaign, the arguments over Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 
the Iraq Invasion, the BBC coverage of the ‘sexed up dossier’, the Hutton 
Inquiry.  
The newspaper 
The Independent on Sunday (IoS) was created in 1990 to complement the daily 
paper. By 2001 both papers were owned by Tony O’Reilly’s Irish Independent 
group. The ‘war on terror’ reporting team operated on the set of news values 
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that O’Neill and Harcup (2009) would have recognised.  As with all news, there 
was ‘gatekeeping’ by selection and inevitably some subjectivity but we strove 
to be topical, objective, accurate, insightful, concise and to engage the reader. 
We were well aware that the main objective of terrorism is publicity and 
reporting has to be sober and measured. After 11 September 2001 the IoS had a 
core team for working on the war on terror anchored by Foreign News Editor 
Ray Whitaker. We worked together regularly during these years often 
supplemented by other reporters depending on the story. From 9/11 to 7/7 I had 
been involved in 50 articles, some solely, most co-authored relating to the ‘war 
on terror’. Then in the two years after 7/7 I was involved in a further 13 stories. 
I ceased writing for the IoS in 2007. 
UK Accounts 
While there are copious accounts and biographical texts of the foreign side 9/11 
and the so called ‘war on terror’ there are very few journalists who have written 
about their work covering the domestic aspects of the war. Reporting through 
the period was often controversial. In the US and to a lesser degree in the UK 
we saw a resurgence in uncritical ‘patriotic’ reporting. In the US there was 
Judith Miller’s now largely discredited reporting for the New York Times that 
was based on falsified information from government and other sources. In the 
UK, No10, MI6, MI5 and others sought to be the primary definers of the 
narrative – especially with the Iraq invasion - and too often UK journalists 
obliged uncritically. David Rose, then The Observer’s home affairs 
correspondent, later wrote a reflective apologetic article for the New Statesman 
in 2007 admitting he had got too close to his intelligence contacts after 9/11. 
To my everlasting regret, I strongly supported the Iraq invasion, in person 
and in print. I had become a recipient of what we now know to have been 
sheer disinformation about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass 
destruction and his purported ‘links’ with al-Qaeda - claims put out by 
Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress (2007).  
The London attacks occurred of an extended period of major change for 
journalism as a result of the internet and social media. In the vernacular, 
gatekeeping was making way for gatewatching where journalists were as likely 
to select User Generated Content (UGC) as it appeared on social media as to 
report. For those on the IoS, as a Sunday newspaper, the task was to provide in-
depth reporting, so USG was of less significance to us than to our colleagues 
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with 24/7 deadlines and we retained a somewhat traditional approach to our 
journalism.  
Literature review 
This review identifies key academic texts on terrorism and in particular the 
London Bombings of July 2005 and the discourse those texts initiate.  Having 
reported on terrorism since 1980 I had read the key terror texts from Wilkinson 
(1974), Sobel (1975) and Laqueur (1977 and 1999) onwards in a ‘rolling 
snowball review’ and was aware of the development of terrorism studies 
(Matusitz 2013) and intelligence studies (Bakir 2015). With 3000 people killed 
in one episode, 9/11 was a historical moment that brought terror to the centre of 
the global stage and raised major questions about journalism in modernity. 
A ‘war on terror’ 
The phrase ‘war on terror’ is a controversial trope. On 20 September 2001, 
during a televised address to a joint session of Congress,  President George W 
Bush proclaimed that: ‘(o)ur 'war on terror' begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not 
end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped, and defeated.’  The term has been used since to encapsulate 
diverse counter-terrorist interventions and invasions by the West usually on the 
premise of containing Islamic fundamentalist inspired terrorist or military action 
including full military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Others believe it 
disguised the neo-con neo-empire ambitions for the US. Pilger has commented: 
‘It is not a war on terror but a war of terror’ (de Burgh 2008, 191). The historian 
Andrew Bacevich observed, terror ‘was not the source of opposition to the 
United States, but only one especially malignant expression’ of it. Terror was ‘a 
tactic, not an enemy’ (Bacevich 2002: 240, 231). He further noted that declaring 
the war on terror, ‘obscured the political root of the confrontation’ and ‘made it 
easier to deflect public attention from evidence suggesting that it was America’s 
quasi-imperial role that was provoking resistance – and would continue to do 
so’ (ibid: 231). It may be an inadequate or even misleading phrase but it has 
become common shorthand for a linked set of events that have run for sixteen 
years and show no sign of ending. 
Reporting the war and terror  
Journalists had written for many decades on their role as war correspondents 
(e.g. See Bell 1995; Simpson 1999, Loyd 2000). By the 1980s the tone of such 
Page | 6 
 
memoirs had often become more critical and less ‘patriotic’. In Robert Harris’s 
book Gotcha!: The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis: he 
concluded 
The episodes which caused the most disquiet, and which have been 
described in this book were not necessarily unique to the Falklands crisis. 
The instinctive secrecy of the military and Civil service; the prostitution 
and hysteria of sections of the press; the lies, the misinformation, the 
manipulation of public opinion by the authorities; the political 
intimidation of broadcasters; the ready connivance of the media at their 
own distortion…al these occurred as much in peacetime Britain as in war 
(1983, 151).  
One of the first social science works to analyse UK war reporting in depth was 
Glasgow Univeristy’s Media Group’s War and Peace News (1985). Then there 
was Morrison and Tumber’s (1986) ethnography of reporters who covered the 
Falklands War to establish the ‘dynamic of war reporting’. Much of the ‘war on 
terror’ narrative is insurgency and terrorism and there is a literature on the way 
the news media report terrorism with Televising Terror (Schlesinger at al 1983) 
as an early example critiquing the TV news output. TV reporter James Rodgers’ 
Reporting Conflict combined his experience, interviews and theory for a 
practitioner-academic text (2012). Journalism after September 11 edited by 
Zelizer and Allan (2002), focussed mainly on the US news media. Following 
9/11, US journalists were accused of reverting to what President Roosevelt had 
once called the ‘patriotic press’ – as epitomised by ABC TV anchor Dan 
Rather’s famous patriotic, thoroughly unjournalistic comments  (Schoenfeld 
2010, 145). In their introduction Zelizer and Allan comment that in pondering 
journalism’s imperatives following the events that shook the world, their 
contributors considered the emergent capacity of those invested with helping to 
give the events voice:  
At the heart of this discussion is a notion not previously addressed in 
scholarship on journalism, namely that of trauma. Frequently invoked as 
a label for a wide range of cognitive-emotional states caused by suffering 
and existential pain, it is our belief that journalists and news organisations 
covering the events of September 11 were wounded too. There were no 
detached vantage-points situated ‘outside’ the crisis from which they 
could objectively observe. And indeed, as we have seen in the months 
that have since passed, trauma does not disappear lightly (2002, 1).  
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The thrust of this argument utilised notions from sociological and psychological 
concepts of ‘trauma’. With this analogy 9/11 was ‘traumatic’, and media 
accounts of the day were ‘traumatised’, by the sheer magnitude of the event and 
journalists exhibited subjectivity and patriotism rather than behaving as 
objective observers. As Holloway states; ‘9/11 was a cataclysm of such 
magnitude, it was suggested, that it abolished media industry concepts such as 
“critical distance” and “observer-hood”, making objective reportage 
impossible.’ 
Holloway further observed that:  
The uncritical patriotism that flooded TV screens, radio airwaves, 
magazines and newsprint after 9/11 was partly a function or reflex of 
trauma, in the sense that it helped reconstruct the abstract collective entity 
threatened by ‘terror’ – ‘America’, and the things ‘America’ meant in the 
dominant media frame: freedom, civilisation, innocence, resolve, 
victimhood, unity and the pursuit of justice via legitimate war (2008 60). 
Journalism after September 11 has one chapter directly relevant to the UK 
national press where Bromley and Cushion suggested that 9/11 showed 
broadsheets newspapers and tabloids were two distinct cultural expressions: 
‘addressing largely different social groupings rather than versions of a single 
artefact ranged along a continuum’.  They also suggested that overall the Press 
adopted a much more serious approaching the tone of its reporting of 9/11 and 
its aftermath. Waisbord’s chapter was a proposal on risk and patriotism where 
‘Hawkish patriotism provided the script to make September 11 and subsequent 
risk intelligible’. Other key texts on the ‘war on terror’ include Jackson (2005) 
who deconstructed the way that rhetoric has been used to justify the global 
counter-terrorism offensive and Norris, Kern and Just (2003) argued in Framing 
Terrorism  that the headlines matter as much as the act, in political terms. In 
Allan and Zelizer’s Reporting War Couldry and Downes (Allan and Zelizer 
2004 266-282) analyse the coverage of the Iraq War build up over a six day 
period  in January 2003 as reported in seven different UK newspapers and 
found  them deeply divided in terms of  being for or against the invasion of Iraq. 
Reporting of the London Bombings  
As with 9/11, a deep critical analysis of reporting followed the events of July 
2005 where 52 people died and also the four suicide bombers. Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin have suggested that since the 7/7 London bombings a new genre of 
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security journalism has become established in British news. This, they said, has 
contributed regular representations of terrorist threats to a presumed national 
audience, offering coverage of the threat ‘we’ face in the form of Al-Qaida 
leaders’ speeches, bomb attempts, criminal trials and ‘radical’ protesters in 
Britain. They state that national security journalism’s delivery of Al-Qaida 
speeches is particularly significant:  
 
By repackaging and remediating jihadist media productions from one 
context and language to another, reporters offer to British audiences 
‘messages’ presumed to be radicalizing to would-be jihadist recruits  
(2010, 903). 
 
In Julian Matthews’ analysis of the 7/7 coverage  he postulated that genetic 
conventions of the news form delimit the possible range of its symbolic 
expression in the first instance, while its story telling function highlights 
instances of suffering and destruction and terrorist tactics in the aftermath of the 
incident: 
Decisions on the legitimacy of news voices define what is said and by 
who here too. Government leaders and spokespeople’s primary definition 
of events (Entman, 2003; Montegomery, 2005) viewed as credible 
commentary at this time not only predominate on this basis in these 
event–centred and decontextualized accounts of terrorism but structure 
their omissions including the absence of the objectives informing terrorist 
actions and the wider context (and sometimes conflict) surrounding them 
(2016, 174) 
Agendas 
An important consideration is the importance of sources in setting the news 
agenda using a careful selection of frames. Within cultural studies there has 
been a source theory discourse (see Hall et al. 1978, Gans 1979, Schlesinger 
and Tumber 1994, Cottle 1998, Manning 2001, Franklin and Carlson 2011). 
These discussions set out a theoretical framework for how the news media find, 
use and publish source material. Schlesinger pointed out that the study of 
sources must take into account:  ‘relations between the media and the exercise 
of political and ideological power […] by central social institutions which seek 
to define and manage the flow of information in a contested field of discourse’ 
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(1990, 62). During the war on terror the intelligence lobby became important 
agenda setters. The relationship between intelligence services and the media is a 
small but growing research area (Hillebrand 2013, Lashmar 2013, Bakir 2015). 
The war on terror was the first where there were formal regular intelligence 
briefings to the UK news media. These briefings were opaque to the public but 
drove specific narratives from 9/11 through the July 2005 bombings into the 
present day. The experience of working with these relationships over a long 
period of time is discussed in Lashmar (2013) which examines in some depth 
one of the most contentious points from 7/7, did MI5 mislead journalists and the 
public, knowing far more about the 7/7 leader Mohammed Siddique Khan than 
they admitted? This paper seeks to see if improvements could be made to 
journalistic practice with the benefit of more than a decade to reconsider what 
was an intense period of reporting. 
Methodology 
This paper’s key research questions are: 
RQ1 By using critical reflexive practice and other methodologies can the 
experience of a practitioner provide insight into the editorial processes in 
covering acts of terror? 
RQ2 Using the same methodologies, can a practitioner place coverage of 7/7 in 
the discourse of editorial processes in the ‘war on terror’?  
RQ3 How did the primary definers help frame the 7/7 attacks? 
Several methodologies are used with reflexive practice used to interrogate the 
data. The use of reflexive, reflective or transformative practice as a pedagogic 
tool has evolved since the 1970s (see: Schön 1983, Kolb, 1984, Prpic 2005, 
Cunliffe 2016). Reflexivity as a pedagogic tool is used across a variety of 
disciplines including sociology, the natural sciences, clinical practice, nursing 
education, osteopathy practice and psychology but rarely in journalism. 
Greenberg has suggested it can help bridge the practice-theory divide in 
journalism education (2007, 289). A handful of journalists have reflected 
critically on reporting of the ‘war on terror’ such as US journalists Dahr Jamail 
and Danny Schechter’s chapters in Media and Terrorism (Freedman and Thussu 
2012). This paper utilises reflexive practice and focusses on praxis which is of 
particular importance to journalism because by thinking more critically about 
our own assumptions and actions, practitioners can develop more collaborative, 
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responsive, and ethical ways of developing the profession and creativity within 
those news organisations. Part of the UK news media has a poor track record of 
immoral, unethical and illegal behaviour notable in recent time around the 
phone hacking scandal (Davies 2014).  Reflexive practice is a natural 
development of Bourdieu’s theory of practice and as he noted, journalists have a 
strong collective identify and self-justifying ethos through their habitus and 
doxa (Benson and Neveu 2005, 58). In some circumstances this cohesion 
sustains and amplifies inappropriate practice. the need for self-conscious and 
ethical action based on a critical questioning of past actions and of future 
possibilitiesit what is after all, a social construct.  
There is a considerable literature on how news is created. Hall (1978) was a 
prominent early theorists who noted that 'news' is the end-product of a complex 
process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and 
topics according to a socially constructed set of categories. The process of 
signification - giving social meanings to events - both assumes and helps to 
construct society as a consensus. The media do not themselves autonomously 
create news items; rather they are 'cued in' to specific news topics by regular 
and reliable institutional sources – ‘preferred sources’.  Entman, in developing 
framing as a useful method for identifying how agendas are set stated: 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Typically 
frames diagnose, evaluate and prescribe (1993, 53). 
Framing entails selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and 
making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, 
evaluation, and/or solution. Entman emphasized a lack of critical reflection by 
journalists:  ‘because they lack a common understanding of framing, journalists 
frequently allow the most skillful media manipulators to impose their dominant 
frames on the news’ (2003, 5).  
Research 
This paper combines reflexive practice, content analysis and framing to analyse 
a corpus of 63 articles articles from the Independent on Sunday written between 
September 2001 and August 2007. A simple content analysis is undertaken to 
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seek general topics in these overall articles, using the headlines and content of 
each article were compared to assess their news angle or foci. 
9/11 to 7/7 
50 articles totalling nearly 50,000 words post 9/11 prior to 7/7. These were all 
news stories, longer form news features or analysis pieces.  
The main episodes include: 
Aftermath of 9/11: Initial American responses; identification of terrorists; 
terrorists relationship with UK; UK security forces responses to threat; 
European connections of 9/11 terrorists; radical preachers; al Qaida networks; 
further plots; lone wolf terrorists; home grown terrorists; possible targets for 
terror attacks; US arrests of 9/11 terrorist  suspects. 
The Anthrax threat in the US was also analysed: US journalists became 
preoccupied with this domestic story, the discovery of anthrax sent to various 
government buildings contaminating a number of victims. For months reports 
suggested a range of suspects from Iraqis to al Qaida fourteen years on we still 
do not who was responsible for the anthrax attacks. 
There are a series of articles reporting but also attempting to test UK 
government claims that Saddam Hussein was evading the UN Weapons 
Security conditions and planned to keep developing WMD. The Iraq invasion 
occurs in March 2003 and we turn to the coverage of the failure to find WMD.  
Sources 
In the UK given that most of the coverage involved terrorism much of the 
security forces work was undertaken in secrecy with the few exceptions of the 
occasional trials which were held in public. We had to rely on public statements 
by politicians and the rarer public utterances of intelligence chiefs.  Academics 
with knowledge of terrorism were also frequently used. Contacts with security 
services were either informal (confidential sources) or formal (unattributable). I 
had confidential sources in the period that provided a different picture of the 
politicization of intelligence. As early as Feb 2003 the IOS provided an 
alternative narrative: 
Britain and America's spies believe that they are being politicised: that 
the intelligence they provide is being selectively applied to lead to the 
opposite conclusion from the one they have drawn, which is that Iraq is 
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much less of a threat than their political masters claim. Worse, when the 
intelligence agencies fail to do the job, the politicians will not stop at 
plagiarism to make their case, even ‘tweaking’ the plagiarised material to 
ensure a better fit. 
‘You cannot just cherry-pick evidence that suits your case and ignore the 
rest. It is a cardinal rule of intelligence’, said one aggrieved officer. ‘Yet 
that is what the PM is doing’, (Lashmar and Whitaker 2004). 
In contrast to its most obvious rival the Observer, the Independent on Sunday 
was sceptical and critical of the Blair government’s intent to invade Iraq. This 
was an organic policy process in the news team but was also ratified at senior 
editor level.   
Blowback 
By August 2003 conversations with MI5 and security officials revealed that 
they were stopping terror plots but were very conscious that sooner or later 
there would be a successful attack. Interestingly they did not choose make this a 
‘frame’ of their narrative. Examining our reports from the post-9/11 certain 
domestic key frames from the political-intelligence elite emerge: 
The external threat frame: Through contacts with the security services we 
established that by early 2002 that MI5 believed it had broken up all possible al 
Qaida operatives in the UK before 9/11 either by arrest or deportation.  
The sympathiser threat frame: What then became the issue was who were 
sympathetic to al Qaida. MI5 believed these were mostly North Africans who 
were funding potential terrorism but a wide range of crimes including credit 
card fraud.  
The convert or home grown threat frame: With the arrest of the ‘shoe bomber’ 
Islamic convert Richard Reid in January 2002, the issue of home grown and 
convert to Islam terrorists first arose. He was seen as a lone wolf, converted in 
prison, who had had some kind of guidance via the internet from al Qaida. We 
also see the discussion about radicalisation developing.  
7/7 and after 
On Thursday 7th July 2005 the IoS team launched into a major reporting 
exercise as soon it was clear it was a terror attack. In our first post 7/7 article we 
offered the analysis:   
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If we are fighting a 'war on terror', then al-Qaida is clearly the enemy. But 
even before it was disrupted by the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and 
the arrest of many members of its inner circle, it was never an 
organisation with a clear hierarchical structure. It has always been as 
much an ideology as a tangible group. ‘Trying to hit al-Qaida is like 
trying to hit jelly,’ said one intelligence source. ‘One minute you think 
you know who is running it, and next minute you feel you have no idea,’ 
(Whitaker and Lashmar 2005a). 
Following through some two weeks later we observed: 
MI5 used to boast that it had identified and dealt with all al-Qaida 
operatives in Britain before the attacks of 2001, and that it knew who 
needed watching among the 600-800 Britons trained in camps run by al-
Qaida in Afghanistan. Resources are concentrated on the 200 or so people 
in the UK deemed the greatest threat to national security. At any one time 
at least 10 round-the-clock surveillance operations are under way 
(Whitaker, Lashmar & Elliott 2005). 
Certainly themes are picked up in the IOS coverage and repeated and amplified 
after the failed 21/7 bombings. These are then developed with further reporting 
as new developments direct the news narratives. Eight weeks after 7/7 al-Qaida 
released the leader of the attack, Khan’s posthumous video. We commented:  
The words of the 7 July suicide bomber Mohammad Siddique Khan were 
chilling, all the more so for being delivered in a flat Yorkshire accent.  
‘Until we feel security, you'll be our target,' he said. 'Until you stop the 
bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we'll not stop 
this fight. We are at war, and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the 
reality of this situation’.  
Most al-Qa'ida tapes and videos, however threatening, are given an other-
worldly quality by their misty, translated rhetoric. Khan's message, by 
contrast, is blunt and direct (Whitaker and Lashmar 2005bsommers). 
I was to be involved with 13 articles on terror after 7/7 with the last being in 
August 2007 in the wake of the Glasgow Airport terror attack. The story themes 
post 7/7 and 21/7 were to be: 
• ‘Home Grown’ terrorists and the alienation of second generation 
Muslims, often in the north of England  
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• How much terror plots were directed by external al Qaeda operatives. 
• Radicalisation and the rising number of converts. 
• Travel to Pakistan and other locations to get terror training.  
• Acquisition of explosives.  
• Surveillance operations 
• Further plots, raid, arrests, attacks and trials.  
It was the home grown problem and radicalisation that became the dominant 
frames of the political intelligence elites in their briefings.  
In the thirteen post - 7/7 articles we directly quoted 
Official security sources – 16 times 
Confidential sources 10 
Politicians - 6  
Terror experts - 16  
Bomber – 1 (from video) 
Relative of bomber – 1 
External jihadist - 2 
Bomb disposal expert -1  
Salman Rushdie - 1 
Other - 2 
 
Analysis and reflection 
Zelizer and Allan’s claim that the media had ‘no detached vantage-points’ over 
9/11 but I would suggest that this was much more a US problem than a UK one 
and the UK reporting was less hegemonic. But that is not to say in the wider 
Press there was pressure to report from a ‘patriotic position’. Even when it came 
to 7/7, some news organisations managed to maintain something of a ‘detached 
vantage–point’ for their reporting of 7/. In his 2016 paper Julian Matthews 
analysed the immediate coverage of 7/7 using ritual communication theory to 
interpret the news coverage. ‘This predicts that newspapers will fuse wider 
concerns over the health of the social system in their retelling of the incident, 
producing from their unified commentary a recognisable, yet ephemeral, 
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reporting genre characterising the moment’ (176). Matthews analysed coverage 
from nine UK national papers including their Sunday counterparts so over the 
eight days after 9/11 to a total of 216 articles. He stated that the view of 
terrorism that emerges from the overall coverage is of terrorism’s role as the 
cause rather than symptom of conflict and the terrorist as operating within this 
situation according to their inner drives or brainwashed misconceptions as 
psychotic thugs or religious zealots, respectively (Chermak, 2003; Curtis, 1987; 
Karim in Zelizer and Allan 2002). This is a difficult proposition for a journalist 
working within the Independent newspapers at the time to accept. I understand 
that these conclusions are based on overall research but I would suggest it needs 
to be more unpacked to get a sense of the individual processes and the agency at 
work. It was not until later that we knew who the suicide bombers were. At the 
IoS we never saw terrorism as a cause but a symptom of alienation. Editorial 
teams and journalists do have agency within the functions of the immediacy of 
news production. Different news organisations respond in different ways subject 
to a range of criteria for reasons that include their editorial stance, experience, 
knowledge, media format and audience.  
In the subsequent coverage of 7/7 IoS’ wider editorial team sought to 
understand the context and sent reporters to the home towns of the suicide 
bombers. The IoS editor had other journalists fulfil different aspects of this 
coverage.  For example, in a few days after 7/7 the IoS ran an analysis piece by 
Jonathan Raban based on research with those who knew the suicide bombers. 
He pointed out the Tony Blair had just made an ‘admirable’ statement: 'We are 
not going to deal with this problem, with the roots as deep as they are, until we 
confront these people at every single level  and not just their methods but their 
ideas.' Raban then picked up from Blair’s comment:  
It is a great step forward to acknowledge that the jihadis have ideas, an 
intellectual framework for their bloody missions, and are not motivated, 
as the Bush administration stubbornly continues to insist, by a spirit of 
pure evil for evil's sake. Arguing with people's supernatural delusions is a 
losing game. But ideas are different. Ideas are negotiable: one can expose 
their false premises, concede their partial truth, disentangle their 
conclusions, rob them of their magic by the force of sweet reason (Raban 
2006). 
Political elite discourse 
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A repeated criticism of the coverage of 7/7 and indeed the war on terror is that it 
gave priority to elite sources. Many of the articles took in comments by the 
government figures. Often it would be leading politicians, officials on the 
record comments by security and military officials or their press people. While 
Hall et al’s (1978) work on primary definers has been the subject to later 
critique, their general explanation is never more apposite than with the 
intelligence services: ‘such spokesmen are understood to have access to more 
accurate or specialized information on particular topics than the majority of the 
population.’ We at the IoS were aware of the problem of anonymous official 
sources but took the view that we listened to what they said and subjected it to 
test wherever possible. At the same time I was also dealing with non-official, 
long-standing contacts within the intelligence agencies. Talking to unsanctioned 
contacts in intelligence was difficult as the journalist should protect their 
sources and it became very difficult around the time of the Kelly affair after the 
then Home Secretary John Reid castigated unofficial sources as a ‘rogue 
element’ on the BBC’s Today programme specifically referring to my sources.  
……I said a rogue element because I thought there was one that was 
briefing Andrew Gilligan or indeed I said indeed elements because there 
may be the same source, there may be the same person, who is briefing 
the Independent on Sunday and various others, I don't know. But they are 
very much in the minority (Today, 2003). 
Plots? 
In his 2013 paper Bournemouth academic Jamie Matthews raised the important 
question of how real the alleged plots were that were a constant part of the 
government and security narrative. This was an ongoing problem and the classic 
example was the ‘Ricin plot’ in 2002, which was highlighted as a major plot at 
the time of the arrests. It later emerged that no ricin had actually been found and 
the actual prosecution case was much reduced and resulted in only one 
conviction. Certainly we reported the MI5 assessment of the number of plots 
and I quote from a September 2004 article:  
Since 9/11, MI5 has monitored those it suspects of close links with al-
Qaida, most of North African birth and believed to number around 30. In 
addition there is a concentric ring of between 300 and 600 supporters and 
active sympathisers. A worry for MI5, reflected by a spate of arrests, is a 
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small but growing number of British-born Muslims becoming al-Qaida 
supporters (Lashmar 2004).  
In November 2004 in questioning whether there really had been a terror plot to 
attack Canary Wharf (McSmith, Lashmar and Bennetto, 2004). And again in 
August 2006 we referred to the notion of ‘dozens of plots’ and those who would 
carry them out:  
Many are being watched day and night amid fears that at least one, 
possibly two, other significant plots are well advanced, and may be 
brought forward in the wake of Operation Overt (Whitaker et al 2006). 
It did and does remain difficult to ascertain how real these claims emanating 
from security sources of many and various plots were. Some ended up in court 
and as Jamie Matthews (2013) pointed out, the courts cases ended with mixed 
results. It is a difficulty the national security reporter faces. On the one hand 
these people are in a position to have this privileged information and there are 
good reasons why they cannot detail the specifics. We therefore take the 
information on the basis that we search for corroboration where possible and 
also would return to such claims in future editions. Examining the frames that 
emerge from the IoS’ post 7/7 from a reflexive standpoint they were created 
mostly by actual events, but often reinforced by elite discourse. We could not 
have ignored them and they were interrogated in the coverage. Some academic 
analysis suggests that journalist downplay the importance of ‘ordinary voices’. 
After citing the Independent’s coverage the day after 7/7 where an article leads 
with first hand testimony of eyewitness and survivor of a tube blast Zeyned 
Basci, Matthews, picking up on Zelizer and Allan’s notion of the ‘wound’, 
stated:  
Newspapers do not position ordinary voices in these prime positions in 
their everyday coverage. At this time, they are included in reporting as 
reference points for wider commentary on the social wound that follows 
(2016, 179). 
Every story is different and while there are, as Julian Matthews says, 
‘templates’, ordinary voices are important if they convey unique insight. I 
cannot recall an occasion when an eyewitness, for example, was considered of 
secondary importance. The problem was accessing ordinary voices that would 
enrich our reporting. We were also keen to reflect the views of those from the 
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communities where jihadists and their sympathisers had lived. We discussed the 
nature of radicalisation and sought to understand. When the suicide bombers’ 
backgrounds were established we worked hard to understand their process of 
radicalisation. We got little insight into those communities into our stories at the 
time. But 7/7 showed that we needed greater diversity of backgrounds in UK 
journalism. As research shows, (Sutton Trust 2007 ) most journalists are drawn 
from a narrow stratum of society and journalism is poorer for it.  
There were occasions when we were proved wrong. We were very sceptical 
about Operation Overt in 2007 with a wave of arrests in this country and 
Pakistan which is said to have prevented the attacks on air travel. This resulted 
in containers with more than 100cls of liquid being banned from aircraft 
because it was believed that terrorists had worked out how improvise bombs in 
flight. In the end the security forces did get convictions in the Operation Overt. 
As the BBC’s Dominic Casciani reported in September 2009:  
...it has taken two prosecutions to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a 
plot which changed the nature of air travel was genuine. Now, the British 
men behind a plan to launch suicide bomb attacks on a succession of 
transatlantic airliners are facing a life in jail (Casciani 2009). 
There were frustrations for working with the IoS. The compiling editor was 
often under enormous pressure and often I did not see the final version until it 
was in print and occasionally I was not happy with the way material had been 
used. I also did not like the IOS senior editors use of the term ‘An Independent 
on Sunday Investigation’ flagged on stories that I had barely two/three days to 
work upon even if I was drawing on many years of reporting this area. It 
undermined the notion of well-resourced and lengthy investigations in which 
Sunday newspapers had once earned, as Champagne puts it, their ‘legitimacy’ 
(Benson and Neveu 2005, 58).  
Political ritual 
In the coverage of 7/7 Matthews’ use of ritual communications theory does fit 
the reporting and the ‘national wound’ does provide a way of conceptualising 
what occurred. There is certainly in the times of a signal moment, in these 
cases, a national tragedy, an effort to capture the zeitgeist and offer the sense of 
a cohesive sympathetic society. I have no problem with this as a journalist but 
would agree that some news organisations verged on the hysterical. Matthews 
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described the impact of 7/7 as an ‘imagined’ wound. To this day it seems real to 
me as the Omagh bombing in 1998 which killed 29. Many years on 7/7 remains 
a ‘priming’ notion of Islamist terrorism, used to conjure a contextual mental 
picture of a horrific act of terrorism in the UK. If ritual communication theory 
does provide a concept to analyse the coverage I think that most journalists 
involved just saw it as reporting relying on their doxa. Schudson observes that 
journalists do not stand outside of their national communities when reporting 
such incidents (Zelizer and Allan 2002, 36-47).  
Conclusions 
By using critical reflexive practice and other methodologies the experience of a 
practitioner who covered 7/7 I would hope this provides insight into the 
editorial processes in the coverage in one newspaper. I would also hope that it 
places the coverage of 7/7 in the wider context of the so-called war on terror 
and in doing so the paper describes how primary definers helped frame the 7/7 
attacks. Rereading the cuttings I sought to identify what we on the IoS had got 
wrong or how we could have better reported the war on terror. Given the 
resources available to us, and that was a major constraint on the unprofitable 
IoS, mostly it is hard to know what we would have done otherwise and that will 
remain for others to deconstruct, analyse and judge. There were considerable 
differences between UK and US coverage of the war on terror. The US had 
rarely experience terrorism yet the UK had had thirty years of IRA terror and it 
had appeared often in the news and also London had been the site of 
intermittent acts of terror derived from causa belli in the Middle East. History 
has confirmed the IoS’ skepticism over the origin and execution of the Iraq war, 
though the Chilcot inquiry took many years to reach the same conclusions.  
There can be little doubt that there was a great deal of poor and ill-considered 
reporting during the years 2001-7. Editors often referring back to some mythical 
national and ‘better’ time with validating tropes like conjuring up ‘the blitz 
spirit’ and ‘they will not change our way of life’. After the Hutton Report the 
savaged BBC were muted in their criticism of the UK Government, limited their 
investigative journalism and developed a more jingoistic tone (Lashmar 2008). 
Parts of the UK press were already jingoistic, negative of anything perceived as 
‘Other’ and concerned to reinforce their paying audience’s prejudices. We were 
also concerned with by-products of counter-terrorism including the desire of 
politicians from both major parties to undermine the Human Rights Act and 
Page | 20 
 
indeed sometimes the rule of law which was often supported by elements of the 
Press notably the Sun and the Daily Mail (see Silverman and Thomas, 2012, 
291). This reporting largely coincides with the same news organisations later 
shown to have been, at the same time, engaged in phone hacking, paying public 
officials and using private detectives to breach individual privacy on the 
industrial scale. This moral vacuum extended to the reporting on the war on 
terror. Indeed some of the Press coverage of the war on terror conformed in the 
worst possible way to Hermann and Chomsky’s Propaganda mode (1988)l.  
Over a decade on from 7/7 the news scene has changed with the rise of diverse 
globalised news organizations increasingly questioning the dominant 
perspective of any nation state. This change has been underway in 24/7 TV 
news for some time but some of the London based news website like the 
Guardian, the BBC and the Mail Online find much of their audience outside of 
the UK. In Global Activism, Global Media, De Jong, Shaw, and Stammers 
argue that ‘Media appear to be increasingly globalised, as national television, 
press, etc. are subsumed in gigantic worldwide flows of information and ideas, 
symbolised by the internet, which offers social and political actors new 
opportunities for direct communication’ (2005, 1). Overall many of the texts 
consulted see journalism as hegemonic and monolithic in responding to events 
in a kind of homogenous reactivity. What I argue most strongly that while some 
do conform to the Hermann and Chomsky’s propaganda Model (1988), the 
national news media always includes non-conformist voices in terms of outlets, 
editorial teams and journalists who exercise agency. There were consistent 
genuine attempts by some news teams during the 2000s to deliver insightful, 
impartial and-in depth reporting.  
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